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Abstract
Development of the Conceptual 








The offshore platforms have a number of equipment in 
process area. This process area faces a high probability of 
hydrocarbon fire accident because most of equipment are contained 
the flammable oil and gas circumstances. Therefore, the fire risk 
ii
analysis is an essential safety study which should be considered in 
the whole development phases of an offshore platform installation.
Based on the information at each development phase and level of 
data, the fire risk analysis results are reflected into the design with
increasing the level of accuracy. However, the results of fire risk 
analysis considering the initial process data and layout data are 
conservative because most of fire risk analysis is performed under 
assumptions and insufficient input data in pre-FEED stage.
There is a need for a way to develop an integrated system to 
overcome the problems of the existing fire risk analysis method. 
The scope of this study is to develop the integrated system, which
is required to respond with the data quickly from process design 
and improve FRA results in pre-FEED stage. This system is named 
as Integrated Fire & Explosion Conceptual Risk Analysis (IFECRA)
system.
The basis of the fire risk analysis input data is defined from 
the process and layout information, and this study proposes the 
standard data transfer sheet. In addition, this study develops the
modules which calculate the leak frequency automatically and 
generate a simplified 3D model. Therefore, the IFECRA is able to
iii
work with 3D fire CFD simulation using a 3D simplified model. 
Furthermore, the fire risk analysis module develops to determine
the failure of critical targets and the rate of passive fire protection 
based on the design accidental loads. Using the developed IFECRA 
system, the fire risk analysis is automatically calculated, and the 
design effect zone is obtained from the both CFD model and 
analytical model fire simulation results. Quantitative comparison
between the failure of critical targets and the rate of passive fire 
protection are done by employing the design effect zone.
For results of the fire risk analysis, it is confirmed that the 
risk analysis results using the IFECRA system have relatively 
accurate compared to the existing fire risk analysis method.
Keywords : Quantitative risk assessment, Fire risk analysis,
Offshore, Topside, Process area, Integrated system, Computational 
fluid dynamics, Analytical model
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Increasing energy consumptions, the resource exploitations 
expand to the sea floor in which the crude oil and gas buried. Most 
of the offshore platforms have a number of equipment in process 
area. This process area faces a high probability of hydrocarbon fire 
accident because most of equipment are contained the flammable oil 
and gas circumstance. Therefore, Fire Risk Analysis (FRA) is an 
essential safety study which should be considered in the whole 
development phases of an offshore platform installation as shown in
Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 Development phases of an offshore platform installation
(Total 2008)
Most of oil major and engineering companies, they are 

















FEED stage to end of offshore development. FRA is needed a 
number of input data from the process design. At different 
development phases, different levels of FRA input data are provided 
from the process data and layout data. However, FRA input data are 
frequently changed and insufficient because process design is under 
development in pre-FEED stage. For these reasons, FRA is 
performed under assumptions and insufficient input data in pre-
FEED stage.
Therefore, there is a need for a way to response frequently 
changed data and to improve the assumed FRA in pre-FEED stage.
The development of integrated system is needed to response data 
quickly from process design and improve FRA results in pre-FEED 
stage. The system is called the Integrated Fire & Explosion 
Conceptual Risk Assessment (IFECRA) system.
1.2. State of Art
There have been many studies on FRA at different 
development phase of an offshore installation as shown in Fig. 2. In 
this chapter, three representative FRA studies are briefly explained. 
First one is the method of “flame-size-based approach” proposed 
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by Krueger & Smith (2003), which is usually adopted in pre-
FEED/FEED stage. The second method is “heat-dose-based 
approach” published in FABIG (2009) and third one is “cumulative 
failure frequency-based approach” proposed by Jin & Jang (2015). 
Both of second and third methods are usually applied in detailed
engineering development phase. The details of each method is 
briefly introduced in the following sections. Detailed descriptions 
are briefly summarized as follows.

















Krueger, 2003 FABIG, 2009 Jin & Jang, 2015
EGINA project USAN project Pazflor project USAN project
Paik & Czujko, 2012
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In pre-FEED/FEED stage of an offshore platform installation, 
FRA concentrates on possible consequences associated with 
potential fire scenarios in terms of impact analysis and PFP 
application under critical targets. The representative method is the 
flame-size-based approach (Krueger and Smith, 2003). It 
evaluates the failure of critical targets or process modules using a 
design flame size obtained from fire simulation. In pre-FEED stage, 
however, a 3D geometric model is not available because the process 
data and the layout data are under development. Hence, fire 
simulation is usually performed using an analytical model without a
3D geometric information. This analytical model provides a 
conservative fire simulation results, therefore overall FRA results 
are conservative too. The flame size-based approach is not 
adequate for detail engineering stage for detail structural 
consequence analysis.
1.2.2.Heat-Dose-Based Approach
FABIG (2009) proposes a heat-dose-based approach which 
is probabilistically assessed the fire load and structural response by 
adopting a conventional exceedance curve of heat dose. Notes that 
17
a heat dose is defined as the time integral of radiation heat flux. In 
detailed engineering stage, a 3D geometric model is used because
the process data and the layout data are fully available. Hence, the 
3D CFD model can be implemented in FRA. Therefore, overall FRA 
results are obtained accurately through fire simulation used CFD 
model than analytical model.
1.2.3.Exceedance-Curve-Based Approach
Paik et.al (2011) and Paik and Czujko (2012) proposed the 
EFEF JIP (explosion and fire engineering of FPSO units) method in 
detailed engineering stage. The EFEF JIP randomly generates fire 
scenarios by input of several random variables associated with 
individual probability density functions. Using the method, a fire 
load can be assessed probabilistically by employing an exceedance 
curve. In this time, the consequence modelling adopts a 3D CFD 
model because a 3D geometric mode is available.
1.2.4.Cumulative Failure Frequency-Based Approach
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Jin and Jang (2015) proposes a cumulative failure frequency-
based approach where the failure of each structural member is 
judged by probabilistically assessing the cumulative failure 
frequency (CFF) of each member in detailed engineering stage. 
This procedure is to identify the critical structure member that has 
a failure frequency exceeding a certain risk acceptance criterion. In 
this design stage, the process data and the layout data are fully 
available, therefore FRA usually adopts a CFD fire simulation.
1.3. Objective in This Study
Fig. 3 shows a general procedure of FRA method used in pre-
FEED stage. Practical details associated with the methodologies in 
general procedures of FRA case will be explained following chapter.
Most of FRA input data are manually determined based on the 
process design (e.g PFD, P&ID). In pre-FEED stage, the process 
design is under development, therefore, FRA input data are 
frequently changed and insufficient. After the fire scenarios are 
finished to identify, the leak frequency should be calculated based 
on the identified fire scenarios. For that, the number of equipment
belonged to each isolated segment is manually counted from the 
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process design. In addition, process design does not provide a 
specific piping length, hence, piping lengths are roughly estimated.
For these reasons, the leak frequency calculation obtains a large 
variance in calculation results. Furthermore, lack of layout 
information and process data, FRA is not possible to use a 3D CFD 
fire simulation because a 3D geometric model is not available in 
pre-FEED stage.
Therefore, this study mainly develops an IFECRA system to 
respond quickly from process design and to improve overall FRA 
results. First of all, this study develops an IFECRA system to 
interface with process simulator for FRA in pre-FEED stage. Also, 
the piping lengths are estimated by using a routing algorithm for an 
accurate calculation of leak frequency. In addition, a fire simulation 
can be performed using CFD model based on the simplified 3D 
model. Finally, IFECRA system is able to automate many 
calculations which are required in FRA.
20


















2. General Procedures of Fire Risk Analysis 
Case in Pre-FEED Stage
Fire risk analysis (FRA) is a subpart of Quantitative risk 
assessment (QRA) which mainly evaluates the fire risk in offshore 
platform. This chapter explains the general procedures (Fig. 3) of 
fire risk analysis case in pre-FEED stage in details.
2.1. Fire Risk Analysis Input Data
FRA input data can be categorized into process design and 
layout design as given in Fig. 4. In the process design, FRA input 
data can be divided into 3 sub-categories such as “equipment”, 
“inventory” and “operating conditions”. First of all, the “equipment”
category can comprise different types of equipment such as 
pressure vessel, pipe, valve, compressor and pump. In addition, the 
“inventory” category includes 2 variables, namely, composition and 
volume. Lastly, the “operating conditions” includes the pressure and 
temperature. In the layout data, FRA input data includes locations of 
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module and equipment. These FRA input data are used in fire 
scenario identification.
Fig. 4 FRA input data
In this study, a central database which stores FRA input data
is proposed. Details of the IFECRA database are explained in 
chapter 3.
2.2. Fire Scenario Identification
`A number of parameters are considered during the fire 
scenario identification such as leak rate, leak duration, leak 
direction, leak location, leak frequency, ignition probability and 
environmental variables. Among the parameters, leak rate, leak 
duration, leak frequency and ignition probability are predictable 
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because they are dependent on the process data. However, the leak 
location and direction are probabilistically determined due to the
randomness. In order to identify the fire scenario, the whole 
process design can be divided into serval isolatable segments
(Total, 2008), and each segment is bounded by shutdown valves
(SDVs) or emergency shutdown valves (ESDVs). The offshore 
process area can be divided by serval number of modules and each 
module is isolated by SDVs or ESDVs in accordance with standard 
classification (Total, 2008). Therefore, each module of offshore 
platform can be represented as a combination of a few isolatable 
segments.
Fig. 5 Case example of process design with isolatable segments
Separator









2.3. Leak Frequency Calculation
The leak frequency of isolatable segment is usually calculated 
using Part Count method proposed by DNV (2011). The frequency 
of hydrocarbon leaks is an input to FRA study. The part count 
method is to count the number of equipment containing the 
hydrocarbon from process design. Here, the equipment includes all 
kinds of potential leak sources such as pressure vessel, valve, 
flange, piping and so on. The part count method can be defined as 
follows.
      =    ×   
 
   
      = Total frequency of identified isolatable segment
 
= The number of equipment types (e.g. pressure 
vessel, compressor, pump, valve and so on)
   = Historical leak frequency of kth kind of equipment
  
= The number of kth kind of equipment in a 
isolatable segment
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The following general rules can be applied in conducting the 
equipment count.
l For valves at the boundary of the isolatable segment 
boundary, one valve and one flange are included.
l Include the process lines containing hydrocarbon/flammable 
chemicals.
l If an isolatable segment contains large quantities of liquid 
and gas (e.g. a separator), it is assumed that 50% of the 
leak frequency is from the gaseous phase and 50% from the
liquid phase. It is often called hierarchy principle proposed 
by Total (2008) [6].
l Detailed process piping arrangement is not available in pre-
FEED stage. Hence, process piping lengths are roughly
estimated as presented in Appendix 7.1.
In this study, historical leak database, an open source released 
from the Oil & Gas Production (OGP) is referred (OGP, 2010). Case 
example of the leak frequency can be calculated for each isolatable 
segment based on Fig. 5. The results of frequency calculation are
listed in Table 1.
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The IFECRA system is able to automate the calculation of the 
leak frequency. In addition, the process piping lengths can be 
estimated by physically arranging the pipes using a routing 
algorithm. Hence, the system intends to increase the accuracy and 
efficiency for the leak frequency calculation using the automation
compared with conventional leak frequency calculation in manual 
way. Detailed descriptions of the leak frequency calculation in 
IFECRA system is laid in Chapter 3.
27
Table 1 Case example of leak frequency calculation by using part 






















0.5 6” 6.20E-04 3.10E-04
1 Flange 1 6” 1.10E-04 1.10E-04
1 Pipe 40.5 6” 7.40E-05 3.00E-03












1 6” 1.30E-04 1.30E-04
2 Flange 4 6” 1.10E-04 4.40E-04
2 Pipe 40.5 6” 7.40E-05 3.00E-03








1 N/A* 1.70E-04 1.70E-04








2 6” 1.30E-04 2.60E-04
3 Flange 6 6” 1.10E-04 6.60E-04
3 Pipe 106.5 6” 7.40E-05 7.88E-03
Total leak frequency of an isolatable segment 3 9.82E-03
* Not applicable
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2.4. Fire Frequency Calculation
The fire frequency of each identified fire scenario is calculated 
from the leak and several probabilities such as ignition probability 
and activation probability of ESD & EDP. The activation probability 
of ESD & EDP can be referred from Total (2008). In this study, fire 
frequency is calculated by multiplying the leak frequency to ignition 
probability. The general formulations are used for fire frequency 
calculation as follows.
     ,  =       ×     
     ,  = Fire frequency of identified fire scenario i
      = Total frequency of identified isolatable segment
     = Ignition probability
The ignition probability used in this study is proposed by Cox
et al. (1990). This ignition probability model is dependent on leak 
rate, and ignition probability equation is defined below.
     = 0.0158 ×  
 .    
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     = Ignition probability
  = Leak rate [kg/s]
An example of the fire frequency calculation for each 
isolatable segment of Fig. 5 is given in Table 2.
Table 2 An example of fire frequency calculation based on 

























FRA indicates that fire simulation results can be measured by
the impact of critical targets by quantifying physical parameters
based on fire scenarios. Typical quantified parameters are 
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respectively flame size and radiation heat flux contour in pre-FEED 
stage.
In most of pre-FEED stages, a 3D geometric model is not 
available due to lack of equipment layout information. Hence, the
analytical model (e.g. Phast) is commonly used in this stage.
However, the analytical model gives the conservative results of fire 
simulation because geometric information is not reflected in the fire
simulation, and consequently leads to conservative risk analysis. 
Therefore, the IFECRA system mainly intends to use a CFD model 
applying a simplified 3D model to increase the accuracy of fire 
simulation result. Detailed description of the 3D generation module 
of IFECRA system is explained in Chapter 3.
2.6. Risk Analysis
Fire risk analysis is performed by applying fire consequences 
with corresponding fire frequencies based on identified fire 
scenarios. In this section, the impacts (i.e. failure of critical targets) 
can be determined using the design accidental loads (DALs).
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2.6.1.Design Accidental Load
The design accidental load (DAL) is determined employing the 
exceedance curve which is generated using fire consequences and 
fire frequencies. The risk acceptance criterion (i.e. 10-4) is used to 
select the DAL for fire load (NORSOK 2001). Fig. 6 presents an 
example of the exceedance curve and determining a DAL for the 
risk acceptance criteria.






































Design Accidental Load (DAL)
Risk acceptance criterion (10-4)
5 min
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The failure of critical target is judged by the fire simulation 
results. The analytical model (e.g. Phast) can provide flame size 
and distance from leak location to specific radiation level. The 
effect zone used in the analytical model can be drawn with a circle 
using the flame size or a contour of specific radiation level. Fig. 7
presents an example of the effect zone defined by a contour of
specific radiation level.
However, in CFD model, it is not possible to draw a circle 
because the flame size is not calculated in CFD model (e.g. 
Kameleon FireEx, KFX). Instead, the radiation heat flux contour is 
used to judge the failure of critical targets. Detailed explanation of 
the effect zone is provided in Chapter 4.
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Fig. 7 Example of the effect zone by using analytical model (e.g. 
Phast)
2.6.3.Design Effect Zone
The design effect zone, a contour circle of the design 
accidental load at each time interval, is used for judging the failure 
of critical targets by checking whether to locate inside the circle or 
not.
Again, the design effect zone can be represented by a circle 
measuring the design flame size or a contour of specific radiation 
level. Fig. 8 (b) presents an example of the design effect zone using 




Fig. 8 (a) Example of exceedance curve and (b) Example of design 




































Design Accidental Load (DAL)




The design effect zone provides a criterion of the failure of 
critical target. The judgement is enabled by whether a critical target 
locates inside in a design circular contour of specific radiation level 
or not. Fig. 9 shows an example module layout of FPSO process 
area, and design distance from leak location to specific radiation 
level is determined as listed in Table 4. Table 3 shows the failure 
time of critical target A. The critical target A becomes failed when 
it is continuously exposed to fire accident. The distance between A 
and leak location is 9m and design criterion (i.e. failure time) is 5 
min. During the first 5 min, the distance is bigger than the 
magnitude of design distance. It indicates that the critical target A
fails if it is not provided any fire protection.
Table 3 Failure time of critical target A and distance from leak 
location to critical target A
Critical target: A
Time to failure (min) 5
Distance from leak location to 
specific radiation level (m) at 
5 min after leak
13
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Fig. 9 Example of FPSO process area layout
Table 4 Design distance for each time duration
Design distance from leak location to specific radiation level at 
each moment
Time (min) 5 10 30 60 120
Distance (m) 13 11 10 8.5 7.5
Therefore, critical target A needs the rate of Passive Fire 
Protection (PFP). Other design distances at each time given in 
Table 4 is utilized to determine the PFP rating. In example, the 
design distance is kept bigger than the distance between critical 
target A and leak location before 60 min. It concludes that the 








The IFECRA system proposed in this study, the failure of 
critical targets and the determination of the rate of FPF is 
automated. Detailed descriptions of the determination of failed 
critical target and the rate of PFP in the IFECRA system are
demonstrated in Chapter 3.
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3. Development of Integrated Fire & Explosion 
Conceptual Risk Assessment System
3.1. Introduction of IFECRA System
The development of an integrated system called IFECRA 
system is based on FRA methodology in pre-FEED stage, and 
applied FRA in the IFECRA system is described in Fig. 10. Central 
database of IFECRA system can collect FRA input data which
automatically transferred from process simulator and layout data. It
seems that the IFECRA system increases the efficiency through
interface with process simulator (e.g. HYSYS). FRA input data and 
data interface are described in the following sections.
Fig. 11 presents a general outline of the developed IFECRA 
system with relevant modules such as inventory calculation module, 
leak frequency calculation module, 3D model generation module and 
fire risk analysis module.
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Fig. 10 Applied FRA in IFECRA system
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After consequence modelling, design accidental load (DAL) 
can be determined through the fire simulation result and fire 
frequency. Importing the design accidental load (DAL) into the 
system, the system is available to analyze the failure of critical 
targets automatically which are exposed under fire loads. Finally,
the Passive Fire Protection (PFP) rating can be determined based 
on failure of critical targets. All these results can be found in user 
interface of the developed IFECRA system. Detailed descriptions of 
the developed modules are explained as follows
3.2. FRA Input Data
FRA input data has investigated referring the existing FRA 
methodology in pre-FEED stage. FRA input data can be defined in 
terms of process through interface with process simulator. In 
addition, FRA input data can be defined in terms of layout by 
employing the reference layout data. This study proposes a 
‘standard data transfer sheet’ which contains FRA input data from 
process simulator and reference ship layout. Overall interface 
procedure is described in Fig. 12. FRA input data in terms of 
process design can be extracted from process simulator (e.g. 
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HYSYS) by proposed standard data transfer sheet. The IFECRA 
system imports the extracted data of standard data transfer sheet.
Fig. 12 General outline of data interface between process simulator 
and IFECRA system
The proposed data transfer sheet which contains FRA input 
data for equipment, valves and pipes are depicted in Fig. 13. 
Detailed properties of FRA input data are listed from Table 5 to 
Table 7 respectively. The IFECRA system reads the proposed data 
transfer sheet using the developed import module. These FRA input 
data are automatically stored in the central database of IFECRA 
system.
In the valve and the pipe data transfer sheet, locations and 
quantities are calculated using a piping routing algorithm and a valve 
positioning algorithm respectively. The piping routing algorithm and 
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valve positioning algorithms are described in details in the following 
sections.
Fig. 13 Case example of data transfer sheet
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Table 5 Example of equipment data transfer sheet
Equipment sheet
Segment ID S510G Pressure 1.862barg
Type Equipment Temperature 112.1C°
Equipment ID EQ001 C1 0.04
Equipment 
Description
2nd Separator C2 0.875






Quantity 1 C5 0.009
Module S5 C6 0.005
Deck Upper C7 0.001
COG X 187500mm C8 0
COG Y 16000mm C9 0
COG Z 58700mm C10 0
Volume 486.72m3 C11 0
Dimension L 18000mm Cv 47.58
Dimension W 5200mm Cp 38.74
Dimension H 5200mm Cp/Cv 1.76





Equipment Description Chock Valve









Table 7 Example of pipe data transfer sheet
Pipe sheet
Segment ID Pressure 1.862barg
Type Pipe Temperature 112.1C°













COG X C8 0
COG Y C9 0
COG Z C10 0
Volume C11 0
Dimension L Cv 47.58
Dimension W Cp 38.74
Dimension H Cp/Cv 1.76
3.3. Central Database of IFECRA System
The central database of IFECRA system collects data from 
reference layout and process design using the proposed standard
data transfer sheet. The IFECRA system automatically stores the 
data into each class such as equipment, valve and pipe. In 
equipment, valve and pipe class, length, width, height, COG, volume, 
quantity, composition and operating conditions are listed. Properties 
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of each class are summarized from Table 8 to Table 10. Fig. 14
shows the central database of IFECRA system represented in the 
form of a class diagram.





































The central database of IFECRA system automatically 
transfers the data to each calculation and simplified model 
generation module, and general outline of IFECRA system is given 
in Fig. 11. FRA in pre-FEED stage, the IFECRA system is able to 
use a 3D geometric model. Therefore, FRA is possible to use a 3D 
CFD fire simulation to increase FRA accuracy in pre-FEED stage. 
Every calculation results can be found in a graphical user interface 
(GUI) of the developed IFECRA system.
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Fig. 14 Central database of IFECRA system expressed by using 
class diagram
For the leak frequency calculation from the general FRA case, 
the piping lengths are estimated roughly. Therefore, there is a large 
variance in leak frequency calculation results. The IFECRA system
not only increases the accuracy of leak frequency calculation, but 
also decreases the variance because the piping lengths are logically
estimated employing a routing algorithm.
A routing algorithm is able to estimate the piping lengths using 
end-tag information. The end-tag consists of two tags of 
Equipment (public)
• ID : string
• Name : string
• Equipment Type : string
• Hole diameter : double
• LeakHole : double
• COG (module base) : double
• Eq_L : double
• Eq_W : double
• Eq_H : double
• Module
• Deck








Ø 3D modelling function
Segment (public) – array [ ]
• ID : string
• Equipment : List<Equipment> [* ]
• Pipe : List<Pipe> [* ]
• Valve : List<Valve>[*]
• Flange : List<Flange>[*]
• Inventory : List<Inventory> [* ]
Hydrocarbon 
Mass/Volume (public)






• C1 ~ C17 : float or double
• H2 : float or double
• CO : float or double
• CO2 : float or double
• N2 : float or double
• H2O : float or double
• O2 : float or double
• Volume fraction : double










• Pressure : double




• segment : 
List<Segment> [* ]
CoordCOG (public)
• X : double
• Y : double
• Z : double
Ø CoordCOG()
Flange (public)
• ID : string
• Name : string
• Hole diameter : double




• ID : string
• Name : string
• Valve Type : string
• Eq_L_i, Eq_W_i, Eq_H_i, 
Eq_L_j, Eq_W_j, Eq_H_j : 
double
• x_v_R, x_v_L, y_v_R, y_v_L, 
z_v_R, z_v_L : double
• Hole diameter : double
• LeakHole : double
• Quantity : double
Ø CalFrequency()
Ø GetVLVPosition(P1, P2)
Ø 3D modelling function
Pipe (public)
• ID : string
• Name : string
• Hole diameter : double
• LeakHole : double
• Historical database
• Pipe length : double
• Eq_L_i, Eq_W_i, Eq_H_i, Eq_L_j, 
Eq_W_j, Eq_H_j : double
• Module
• Deck
• Initial length : double
• K1 : double
• K2 : double
• Critical length : double
• VolumeTube : double
• P1 : CoordCOG
• P2 : CoordCOG
Ø GetDistance(P1, P2)
Ø GetHalfDistance(P1, P2)
Ø CampareTo : function
Ø VolumeCalTube()
Ø CalFrequency()
Ø 3D modelling function
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equipment to which the pipe is connected, and using the end tag, the 
2 connected equipment can be identified, and their information also 
can be searched. An example is presented in Fig. 15.
Fig. 15 Systematic description of end-tag information with 
searched equipment information
In Fig. 15 the 2 equipment can be identified by using the end 
tag, TOVZ2001A-TOES2001A-PIPE001, which both includes the 
equipment tags, i.e. TOVZ2001A and TOES2001A. The equipment 
information contains the type of equipment, equipment ID, 
description, COG, dimension and so on.




















A rectilinear method is a simple routing algorithm and it 
purposes to find the minimum rectilinear distance between 
equipment (Kellogg 1956). Procedure of using rectilinear method is 
shown in Fig. 16. Six nodes are calculated dependent on connection 
constraints.
Fig. 16 Routing algorithm by using rectilinear method
The connection constraint conditions in a routing algorithm are
visually illustrated in Appendix 7.2. The connection constraint 
conditions provide the coordinates of the six nodes that are 
generated based on the location of the equipment. General 
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procedures of routing algorithm adopting a rectilinear method are 
summarized as the following steps.
l Step 1: Search the information of equipment to which the 
pipe connects using end-tag information and apply
connection constraint conditions.
l Step 2: Generate six number of nodes between the
equipment. The IFECRA system saves the generated six 
nodes. Fig. 17 shows an example of the generated six nodes
depending on the connection constraint condition,
Fig. 17 Example of the generated six nodes depending on 
connection constraint condition
The piping routing using a rectilinear method can quickly 
estimate piping length and volume. However, this piping path 
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overlaps with the surrounding equipment because total six nodes 
are inherently fixed. An example regarding the problem is shown in 
Fig. 18 when using the rectilinear method. Therefore, this study 
considers a path searching algorithm such as A* method.
Fig. 18 Simple example of routing algorithm by using rectilinear 
method
3.3.2.Routing Algorithm: A* Method
An A* method is a kind of searching algorithm which finds the 
smallest path cost. The piping path is able to avoid the surrounding 
equipment using A* method and it makes more realistic (Kim 2014).
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Overall procedures of A* method are shown in Fig. 19 and the 
relevant equation (i.e. heuristic equation) is defined as below.
 ( ) =  ( ) + ℎ( ) +        
  = The last node on the path
 ( )
= The minimum cost of all routes to the end node 
via node  
 ( ) = The cost of the path from the start node to  
ℎ( )
= The shortest path cost from node   to the end 
node
         = The bending cost
This study selects the cost of the path from the start node to n 
node as 10. The bending costs is a kind of penalty function, hence 
the bending cost is carefully determined. The bending cost of this 
study choses about 11. In addition, the shortest path cost from node 
n to the end node uses a rectilinear distance cost shown below.
h(n) = |     −   | + |     −   | + |     −   |
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However, the applied A* algorithm in this study has a 
limitation. Mainly, the searched path is to just avoid overlapping 
with other equipment and the path may not be optimal. In order to 
find the optimal path ℎ( ) should be also calculated as the shortest 
path without any overlap with equipment. In addition, this algorithm 
mainly provides the pipe lengths and pipe coordinate points to 
calculate the leak frequency and to generate a simplified 3D model.
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Fig. 19 Routing algorithm by using A* method
In this study, the bending cost is taken into account with the 
applied A* method to avoid random bending of the path. In addition, 
the applied A* method of this study only searches 6 path directions 
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from nth node. Fig. 19 presents a routing algorithm. Before the 
demonstration of routing algorithm, an “open node lists” and a 
“close node lists” are briefly defined as follows. An open node lists 
is represented as a certain number of nodes, with the exception of 
obstacles. A close node lists is indicated that a piping coordinate is 
saved as a node. General procedures of routing algorithm using A* 
method are summarized as follows.
l Step 1: Search the information of equipment to which the 
target pipe connects to, using the end-tag information. In 
order to apply the routing algorithm, the space between the 
2 equipment should be numerically defined, for that a certain 
number of nodes are introduced to discretize the space. In 
this study, the number of node is selected as the same, 
namely, 9 for each direction as shown in Fig. 20, and grid 
sizes are different in each direction. The applied algorithm 
can afford to adopt much more nodes, but if the number of 
node is too large, the computational costs may be highly 
increased. Finally, the generated nodes are then saved into 
the node lists of the central database of IFECRA system.
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Fig. 20 Example of generated 9 x 9 x 9 nodes in three dimensional 
between equipment (i) and equipment (j)
l Step 2: Determine the obstacles in discretized numerical 
pace presented by the generated nodes. Fig. 21 presents an 
example of determining the obstacle (e.g. equipment k). If 
the nodes are located inside the space occupied by the 
equipment k, these nodes are then regarded as the false 
nodes. This process is accomplished by the equations ①-③
given in Fig. 21. After identifying all of the false nodes, only 
the true nodes are saved into open node list from the 






Fig. 21 Example of identifying the presence of obstacles in 729 
nodes using the quantified dimension of equipment (k)
l Step 3: Search the path directions. In this study, the path 
directions have a six directions such as leftward, rightward,














Fig. 22 Presentation of the selected path directions
l Step 4: Calculate the minimum path cost from the target node 
to the end node using the A* equation. Fig. 23 illustrates the 
bending constraint. From Fig. 23, if the change is made from 
a single component only from the each searched node (e.g. 
x-component), the change of which needed to be done in at 
least three of them, then the bending constraint cannot use in
the A* equation. Except this case, the bending constraint can 








Fig. 23 Illustration of bending constraint
Finally, each path direction (or node) calculates the A* 
equation, and next path moves to the minimum cost among
the calculated path costs and save the node into the close 
node list.
l Step 5: Repeat step 3 and step 4 and calculate piping lengths




The piping routing applying A* method can provide more 
accurate results than a rectilinear method. Fig. 24 presents a simple 
example of routing results adopting the A* method. A simple 
example of A* algorithm is demonstrated visually in Appendix 7.3. 
The both piping algorithms are used in terms of inventory and leak
frequency calculations and a simplified 3D model generation in the 
developed IFECRA system.
Fig. 24 Simple example of routing algorithm by using A* method
3.3.3.Valve Positioning
The process design such as process flow diagram (PFD),
piping & instrument diagram (P&ID) and process simulator (e.g. 
HYSYS model) is able to provide the quantities of valve. However, 
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they cannot provide the physical locations such as COG and module 
location as shown in Fig. 25. However, the developed IFECRA 
system is able to calculate the physical positions.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 25 Case examples of process design (a) PFD/P&ID, and (b) 
process simulator (e.g. HYSYS).
The valve positioning is used in the leak frequency calculation 
and a simplified 3D model generation. This study calculates the 
physical position of the valve through the appropriate assumptions.
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General procedures of the valve positioning are summarized in
details as follows.
l Step 1: Search the information of equipment using the valve 
end-tag information and collect the pipe close node lists 
from the central database of IFECRA system.
l Step 2: Finds the bending point of the pipe among the pipe 
close list. For example, when considering a set of the pipe 
nodes (       ,      ,⋯ ,      ) as shown in Fig. 26 the 
IFECRA system finds a start node (     ) and a bending 
point of the pipe (     ) using the close pipe node list.
Fig. 26 Example of calculating the valve position
l Step 4: Calculate the positions of the ESDV & valve using a 
start node and a bending point of the pipe. This study
Bent point
Pipe coordinate point in the close node list
Coordinate point in the valve node list
Calculated Valve coordinate point
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assumes that the ESDV and valve are located in front of 
equipment. In addition, the location of ESDV and valve is
assumed that they are placed at a half-length between the 
front of the equipment and bent point of the pipe, since the 
fluid pressure can damage the bent-part of the pipe. Fig. 26
presents an example of calculation of the valve position as 
mentioned above.
3.4. Inventory Calculation Module
The inventory information such as fuel volume, operating 
pressure, operating temperature and composition are the input 
values of consequence modelling in FRA. During the consequence 
modelling in FRA, the inventory size is determined by the largest
equipment of the isolated segment. However, the process design is 
hard to provide process piping volumes as shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 
25. Hence, most of FRA methods in pre-FEED stage, inventory 
volume size calculation is takes into account the equipment size
only. The inventory volume is important variable to determine the 
leak duration of fire accident.
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Therefore, the developed IFECRA system automatically 
calculates the inventory volume size of which can combine the 
equipment size and pipe volume. An accurate estimation of 
inventory size can increase accuracy of the results because fire 
simulation is dependent on leak rate and leak duration. Detailed
procedures of the inventory calculation algorithm are summarized 
as follows.
l Step 1: Calculate the equipment volumes using the 
equipment information from the central database of IFECRA 
system.
l Step 2: Calculate the process piping volume that employs the 
pipe close node list from the central database of IFECRA 
system.
l Step 3: Summate the equipment size and the pipe volume
within the boundary of the isolated segment.
l Step 4: Find the maximum value of operating pressure and 
temperature of the equipment to the boundary of the isolated 
segment.
However, in the current study, for simplicity, the volume of 
pipe is neglected.
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3.5. Leak Frequency Calculation Module
For the leak frequency calculation in general FRA case, the
number of equipment is counted manually in the process design.
Also, many process designs are required when calculating leak 
frequency. In addition, process piping length is roughly estimated in 
the leak frequency calculation because the process design is not
able to provide the piping lengths. Hence, the leak frequency 
calculations have large variance in the results.
66
Fig. 27 Leak frequency calculation flowchart
The developed leak frequency calculation module of IFECRA 
system counts automatically the number of equipment. In addition,
the developed module directly estimates the pipe lengths using a 
routing algorithm. Therefore, the leak frequency calculation module
has relatively small variance in results. Moreover, the developed
module can increase the efficiency of FRA calculation. Fig. 27
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presents the leak frequency calculation flowchart of the applied leak 
frequency calculation module.
General procedures of leak frequency calculation module are
summarized as follows.
l Step 1: Identify the equipment, valve and pipe placed at the 
isolated segment boundary. The equipment, valve and pipe 
information are automatically transferred from the central 
database of IFECRA system.
l Step 2: Count the number of equipment, valves and pipes, if 
the isolated segment includes the identified equipment, 
valves and pipes. The quantities of equipment and valves are 
automatically transferred from the central database of 
IFECRA system. The pipe lengths are calculated up to the 
valve position using the pipe close node list and valve 
coordinate points. If the coordinate point of valve is not 
provided, then the pipe length has a half-distance between 
the equipment.
l Step 3: Calculate the leak frequency using the OGP database.
The developed IFECRA system stores the historical leak 
frequency of the OGP database.
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Fig. 28 Example of the leak frequency calculation at the block 
boundary
Optionally, the leak frequency calculation model calculates the 
leak frequency at the block boundary. The block boundary can be 
provided by the coordinate points. Using the coordinate points of 
block boundary, the system automatically calculates the equipment 
quantities. In addition, the pipe length is calculated up to the block 
boundary using the pipe open node lists and the coordinate points of 
the block boundary. Fig. 28 shows an example of the leak frequency 
calculation at the block boundary. The quantity of equipment is 
counted by multiplying the area ratio and quantity as given in Fig. 
28. Also, the pipe length is calculated using the pipe open node lists 





3.6. Simplified 3D Generation Module
In most of pre-FEED stages, a 3D geometric model is not 
available in general FRA case. Hence, a geometric information is not 
implemented in the risk analysis. An analytical model (e.g. Phast) 
gives a conservative result of the risk analysis because fire 
simulation does not reflect geometric information.
This study, however, a simplified 3D geometric model is 
readily available using a simplified 3D model generation module of 
the IFECRA system. Hence, the developed IFECRA system is able
to use a 3D CFD fire simulation such as Kameleon FireEx (KFX). 
Therefore, the accuracy of risk analysis can be improved by 
performing a CFD simulation with a simplified 3D geometric model.
A simplified 3D geometric model is available in KFX which is a 
commercial software of 3D CFD fire simulation. The KFX geometric 
model (.kfx) has a text format, hence it easily generates a 
simplified 3D model by using geometric element commands 
introduced in KFX user manual (KFX 2010).
From the KFX (2010), the KFX geometric format (.kfx) has 
four commands that describe geometry and one statement that 
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groups the geometry primitives into parts. In this study, KFX 
geometry commands are used in Table 11 below.
Table 11 KFX geometry commands (KFX 2010)
Cylinder Along Coordinate Axis
Command
CYL: X0 Y0 Z0 RADIUS LENGTH 
ORIENTATION
X0 Y0 Z0 Coordinates of the starting point (in mm)
LENGTH Length of cylinder (in mm)
RADIUS Radius of cylinder (in mm)
ORIENTATION
X, -X, Y, -Y, Z, -Z, i.e. a character denoting 
which coordinate direction the cylinder is 
pointing
Skew Cylinder or Cone
Command SCYL: X0 Y0 Z0 X1 Y1 Z1 R0 R1
X0 Y0 Z0 Coordinates of the starting point (in mm)
X1 Y1 Z1 Coordinates of the ending point (in mm)
R0 Radius at starting point (in mm)
R1 Radius at ending point (in mm)
Box Oriented Along Axis
Command
BOX: X0 Y0 Z0 DX DY DZ [P XPH YPH ZPH 
VPH]
X0 Y0 Z0 Coordinates of the starting point (in mm)
DX DY DZ Dimensions of box (in mm)
P If the character P is present, it denotes 
XPH YPH ZPH Optional directional surface porosity for the box
VPH
Optional volume porosity for the box
The porosity is a value between 0 and 1, where 
0 is fully closed and 1 is filly open
Skew Box
Command SBOX: X0 Y0 Z0 X1 Y1 Z1 HEIGHT WIDTH
X0 Y0 Z0
Coordinates of the starting point at the center 
axis of the box (in mm)
X1 Y1 Z1
Coordinates of the ending point at the center 
axis of the box (in mm)
HEIGHT Height of the box (in mm)
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WIDTH Width of the box (in mm)
Based on Fig. 29, an example of a simplified 3D KFX model is 
in Table 12 utilizing KFX geometry commands.
Table 12 Example format of KFX model based on Fig. 29
Simplified 3D model (.kfx)
//Separator
BOX:                   P 0 0 0 0
//Cooler
BOX:                   P 0 0 0 0
//Valve01
BOX:          1000 1000 1000 P 0 0 0 0
//Pipe01
SCYL: 	                      156 X
SCYL: 	                      156 Y
⋮
SCYL: 	                            ,  156 Z
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Fig. 29 Systematic description of the developed a 3D model 
generation module
3.7. Fire Risk Analysis Module
In pre-FEED stage, the fire risk analysis can determine the 
failure of critical targets based on analytical fire simulation results 
by hand. Hence, the FRA is inefficiency to determine the fire risk 
analysis results. Therefore, this study improves efficiency by 
developing a fire risk analysis module.
The developed fire risk analysis module can automatically 

























Passive Fire Protection (PFP) can be automatically provided by 
adopting the developed module. The fire risk analysis module 
consists an impact analysis and a risk control. Fig. 30 shows a 
procedure of the developed fire risk analysis module.
Fig. 30 General procedures of the fire risk analysis module
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First of all, the impact analysis determines the failure of 
critical targets using a design accidental load (DAL). The critical 
target is identified from the database of IFECRA system. This study 
proposes the exposure rate. This exposure rate can additionally
provide a judgment on the failure of equipment to increase the 
accuracy. Also, the risk control determines the rate of PFP using 
the impact analysis results. Detailed procedures of the risk analysis 
module are summarized as follows.
l Step 1: Import design accidental load (DAL) into the 
IFECRA system and select design criteria (e.g. radiation 
heat flux level at 37.5kW/m2).
l Step 2: Generate 26 nodes on surface of the equipment. The 
equipment information can be automatically transferred from 
the central database of IFECRA system. The radiative heat 
flux of generated 26 nodes are calculated using a design 
accidental load (DAL). At this time, the trilinear 
interpolation method is used to calculate the heat flux of the 
generated nodes.
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Fig. 31 Example of calculating the exposure rate
If a certain equipment locates in the design effect zone and 
the exposure rate exceeds the user defined criteria, then the 
developed module saves the equipment tag and the failure 
time into the system.
l Step 4: Estimate the failure duration and determine the PFP 
rating based on the impact analysis results.
Fire risk analysis results such as impact analysis and the rate 































Radiation over design criteria
Radiation under design criteria
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3.8. User Interface
In this study, the IFECRA system includes the development of 
the calculation modules such as leak frequency calculation module, 
simplified 3D model generation module, fire risk analysis module 
and user interface. Fig. 32 shows the screenshot of the IFECRA 
system. On the top of user interface, menu bar provides the export 
of the thermal radiation heat flux contour data. Below the menu, the 
number of developed module is presented as buttons.
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Fig. 32 Screenshot of the IFECRA system
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4. Case Study
4.1. Fire Scenario Identification
Fig. 33 shows a FPSO process area model generated by a 
simplified 3D model generation module of developed IFECRA 
system. The process equipment information is defined based on 
data transfer sheet from the process simulator (e.g. HYSYS). This 
case study is under the assumption that the HAZID work has 
already been completed. Therefore, it is determined that the main 
hazardous inventories in P5 module are the two phase separators 
(i.e. oil and gas). This case study only considers scenarios related 
to the jet fire accidents. Also, it is assumed that three kinds of 
time-dependent leak rate (i.e. large, medium and small) have been 
calculated according to operating conditions of the identified 
inventories (Sávio & Asmund 2010) and leak profiles are shown in 
Fig. 34.
This study selects the main inventory of P5 module using the
proposed standard data transfer sheet. Table 13 shows the 
parameters for the identified scenario with chosen values. The 
proposed standard data transfer sheet provides the inventory size, 
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composition, operating pressure and temperature. In this time, the 
inventory size is only determined by the equipment size.
Fig. 33 FPSO process area in case study
Table 13 Parameters for scenario identification
Parameter Chosen value
Leak rate
Large [65mm], Medium 
[20mm], Small [5mm]
Leak location Volumetric center at module P5
Leak direction
10 (left, right, upward, 
downward, forward, backward, 
diagonal)
Wind direction Same as leak direction
Inventory size 187.7m3




Fig. 34 Time dependent leak profile
The leak rate of hydrocarbon ejected from the process 
equipment diminishes as time passes because the leak is gradually 
stopped by the emergency showdown (ESD) or emergency de-
pressurize (EDP) system. Hence, the leak profile is time dependent
because leak rate is decreased during the time. Therefore, 
employing leak profile into fire simulation can lead the dynamic 
effect of fire accident (Sávio & Asmund 2010). Fig. 34 is the 
considered leak profile based on leak hole size. In the actual fire
accidents on FPSO process area, the leak rate is decayed over the 
time, and it is commonly called the dynamic (or transient) fire




























The transient effect of a jet fire has to be because it 
influences the accuracy of fire simulation. However, if the entire 
duration of transient fire is considered, the computational time is 
required too much. Therefore, a simplified transient fire simulation 
method using a snapshot method is applied in this study to reduce 
the fire simulation time (see Jin & Jang 2015, Lee et al. 2016).
The leak location places at volumetric center of module P5,
and typically 10 leak directions are selected as recommended by
FABIG (2009).























Leak direction is probabilistically determined because leak 
directions are inherently random. Leak directions are considered 
with 10 cases as presented in Fig. 35. If a number of leak direction 
are increased, than identified fire scenarios are increased. 
Therefore, it is needed to select effective leak directions in CFD 
fire simulation.
Fig. 36 shows a fire simulation result. Dotted line indicates 
that the fire simulation is considered about 10 leak directions. While, 
the contour presents a result of fire simulation considered 18 leak 
directions. It is concluded that 10 leak directions are fully enough in 
this case study.
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Fig. 36 Fire simulation result comparisons through the number of 
leak directions
4.2. Leak Frequency Calculation
The leak frequency in module P5 of FPSO process area is 
calculated using the leak frequency calculation module of the 
developed IFECRA system. Fig. 37 displays the output of leak
frequency calculation results from the developed graphical user 
interface (GUI).
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Fig. 37 Leak frequency calculation results by using developed leak 
frequency calculation module
Table 14 Leak frequency calculation results dependent on leak hole 
size
Leak frequency
Small [5mm] Medium [20mm] Large [65mm]
1.21E-02 4.58E-03 9.01E-04
Table 14 summarizes the summation of leak frequency 
calculation results in module P5 of FPSO process area dependent on 
leak hole size (i.e. large, medium and small).
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4.3. Fire Frequency Calculation
The fire frequency of identified fire scenarios are calculated
by multiplying leak frequency and ignition probability. The ignition 
probability used in this case study applies the Cox et al. (1990)
ignition model. Detailed descriptions of ignition probability were 
explained in Chapter 2. The results of ignition probability 
calculation are given in Table 15. Also, the results of fire frequency 
calculation are obtained in Table 16.
Table 15 Results of ignition probability calculation by using Cox et 
al. (1990)
Ignition probability
Small [5mm] Medium [20mm] Large [65mm]
1.58E-02 3.20E-02 5.75E-02
Table 16 Fire frequency calculation results
Fire frequency





This study, the fire simulation is carried out using the 
Kameleoaon FireEx (KFX) software. KFX is the most advanced fire 
simulator which is available to reflect the turbulent combustion flow 
using the Eddy Dissipation Concept proposed by Magnussen and 
Hjertager (1976), and simultaneously calculate the radiation heat 
flux employing the Discrete Transfer Model (DTM) proposed by 
Shah and Lockwood (1979). The basic concept of DTM is that 
radiation exchange is calculated by integration of radiation 
absorption and emittance along a huge number of rays throughout 
the calculation domain (KFX 2010). The accuracy is depended by
the number of ray that goes through the flame such as the given in 
Fig. 38.
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Fig. 38 Radiation flux calculated in one grid point [13]
This study briefly explains a physical concept of radiation heat 
flux calculation. Radiation intensity I for certain direction is defined 
as a rate of radiation energy emission or absorption per unit area 
normal to the direction, unit solid angle of the direction, unit wave 
length and unit time (Siegel & Howell 1992). The equation of 
radiation intensity is given in below.
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I(λ, θ, ϕ) =
   
            
I = Radiation intensity
  = Energy rate; energy per unit time
  = Surface area
  = Wave length
R
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DTM is used for calculating the radiation intensity for all 
directions over sphere. Furthermore, the obtained radiation 
intensities are used for calculating radiation heat flux through 
mathematical integrations over sphere.
In KFX, radiation heat flux calculation is carried out by using 
the bullet monitor. Bullet monitor is a virtual small ball spread over 
the entire domain and its surface is discretized by proper number of 
solid angle for logging the entire radiative intensities such as Fig. 
40.
Fig. 40 Visualized the bullet monitor with the calculated radiation 
intensity (KFX 2010)
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This study, the bullet monitor points are placed in a regular 
grid pattern such as given in Fig. 41. Table 17 presents the input 
data used for setting the bullet monitor points in KFX.
Table 17 Properties of bullet monitor setting in KFX
Variable Chosen value
Number of ordinates (rays) 500
Adaptive trace On
Lower corner (X) 150m
Node distance (dX) 5m
Number of nodes (X) 28
Lower corner (Y) 50m
Node distance (dY) 5m
Number of nodes (Y) 20
Lower corner (Z) 32m
Node distance (dZ) 5m
Number of nodes (Z) 12
Total bullet monitor points 28 x 20 x 12 = 6720
91
Fig. 41 Bullet monitor points to obtain the radiative heat flux around 
FPSO topside process area
4.4.2.Fire Simulation Result
In this case study, a fire accident is simulated by both
analytical model (e.g. Phast) and 3D CFD model (i.e. KFX) to 
compare the radiation heat flux contour results. First of all, the fire 
simulation result is compared between the CFD model and the
analytical model respectively. Also, the fire simulation result
analyzes the comparison between CFD model without the 3D 
geometric model and analytical model.
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Fig. 42 presents the radiation heat flux contour of fire 
simulation using the both analytical and CFD model respectively.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 42 Radiation heat flux contour comparison between (a) 
analytical model (Phast) and (b) CFD model (KFX)
According to the consequences of fire simulation, it is 
obviously concluded that geometric model has a significant effect on 
the fire consequence as given in Fig. 43. For this reason, the area 
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of radiation heat flux contour in analytical model is bigger than CFD 
model.
Fig. 43 Jet fire flame interaction with surrounding equipment in CFD 
fire simulation
Fig. 44 shows a case example of radiation heat flux contour 
comparison of the analytical model (e.g. Phast) and CFD model (e.g. 
KFX). In this time, the geometric model is not applied in CFD model.
For this fire simulation result, the radiation heat flux contours seem
similar distributions.
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Fig. 44 Radiation heat flux contour comparison both analytical model 
and CFD model without geometry
4.5. Risk Analysis
4.5.1.Design Criterion
A set of design (i.e. impact) criterion is used to evaluate the 
critical target. The set of applicable criteria for the impact on 
critical targets is dependent on radiation levels, based on 
assumption by Total (2009).
l The thermal radiation level which can impair the escape 
routes is considered to at 4.7kW/m2.
l The thermal radiation level at 9.5kW/m2 is considered to fire 
zoning considerations in FRA and 1% lethality for QRA.
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l The thermal radiation level at 37.5kW/m2 is selected for 
assessment of damage to equipment.
The fire consequences consider the impact of the potential 
fires on FPSO performed on a module by module basis. The failure 
time of critical target is used by evaluating the impact analysis and 
the failure time is indicated in Table 18.
Table 18 Design criterion for each critical target with failure time
Critical target Failure time
Adjacent flexible risers 5 minutes
Process vessel 5 minutes
Piperack 5 minutes
Module supports 10 minutes
Flare tower 10 minutes
Crane pedestal 10 minutes
Hull deck 15 minutes
FPSO hull side 20 minutes
E & I buildings 10 minutes
Living quarters 10 minutes
Fire water pump enclosures 10 minutes
Fire water caissons 10 minutes
Flare KO drums 5 minutes
Secondary muster shelter 5 minutes
In case study, a level of radiation is selected about 37.5kW/m2
for evaluating the failure of equipment (i.e. impact analysis).
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4.5.2.Design Effect Zone
The design effect zone is possible to identify the failure of 
critical targets. For KFX, it is not available to draw a circle because 
KFX does not calculate the flame size. However, KFX can select the 
monitoring points over the entire calculation domain. Hence, the 
detailed procedures of determining the design effect zone in KFX 
can be summarized as follows.
l Obtain the exceedance curve combining radiation heat flux 
values determined from monitoring points and fire frequency.
l Calculate the design radiation heat flux values according to 
the design acceptance criterion.
l Obtain the design radiation contour using design radiative 
heat flux values.
l Fits a curve to the design radiation contour employing the 
least squares ellipse fitting method.
Fig. 45 shows the above procedures visually, and the 6720 
monitoring points are selected over the entire calculation domain in 
this case study. In this time, the monitoring points can be 
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represented by the bullet monitoring points as described in Section 
4.4.
Fig. 45 Example procedures of determining the design effect zone 
by using radiation heat flux data from monitoring points
The level of radiation contour about 37.5kW/m2 is used, and 
design effect zones for each time are shown from Fig. 46 to Fig. 50.
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Fig. 46 Design radiation contour and effect zone at 5 minutes
Fig. 47 Design radiation contour and effect zone at 10 minutes
Fig. 48 Design radiation contour and effect zone at 30 minutes
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Fig. 49 Design radiation contour and effect zone at 60 minutes
Fig. 50 Design radiation contour and effect zone at 120 minutes
4.5.3.Design Effect Zone Comparison
The design effect zones are compared to the analytical model 
and the CFD model. The design effect zone used in Phast is 
described in Chapter 2. Design effect zones are shown from Fig. 51
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to Fig. 55. The comparisons are clearly shown that the design 
effect zone resulted from the analytical model (e.g. Phast) is 
obtained bigger area than the CFD model (e.g. KFX).
Fig. 51 Design effect zones at 5 minutes between KFX and Phast
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Fig. 52 Design effect zones at 10 minutes between KFX and Phast
Fig. 53 Design effect zones at 30 minutes between KFX and Phast
Fig. 54 Design effect zones at 60 minutes between KFX and Phast
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Fig. 55 Design effect zones at 120 minutes between KFX and Phast
4.5.4. Impact Analysis Results
The failure of critical target is determined by the design effect 
zone. The failure of critical target is checked by comparing a target
location and a contour of specific radiation level (i.e. design effect 
zone). The fire risk analysis module of the developed IFECRA 
system automatically determines the failure of critical targets. In 
this study, the results of failure target can be found in the 
developed graphical user interface (GUI).
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Fig. 56 The impact analysis results by using the fire risk analysis of 
developed IFECRA system
Fig. 57 illustrates an example of the impact analysis results 
between KFX and Phast. The critical target TOES 7004 is located in
a circle with design effect zone at 5 minutes. However, at 10 
minutes, TOES 7004 is only placed inside a circle in design effect 
zone employed Phast. From Table 19 to Table 21 show the results 
of impact analysis.
Module P5 is the place where a fire accident is occurred, 
therefore the most of equipment are exposed under the fire
accident. In module P6 and S5 which are located within a short 
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distance from module P5, the most of equipment are exposed to the 
fire when the analytical model (e.g. Phast) is used. However, a few 




Fig. 57 Impact analysis comparison between KFX and Phast (a) 
Design effect zone with critical target at 5 minutes (b) Design 
effect zone with critical target at 10 minutes
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Table 19 Impact analysis result comparisons in module P5
ID Descriptions Type Module 5min 10min 30min 60min 120min
TOVZ7601
Cooling Water Expansion 
Drum
Vessel P5 Top ●
●
TOVF8510B Wash Water Cartridge Filter Vessel P5 Upper ○ ● ○ ● ○ ● ○ ● ○ ●
TOVF8510A Wash Water Cartridge Filter Vessel P5 Upper ○ ● ○ ● ○ ● ○ ● ○ ●
TOVZ3010 H2S Scavenger Buffer Drum Vessel P5 Upper ○ ● ○ ●
TOVZ8510 CST Buffer Drum Vessel P5 Upper ○ ● ○ ● ○ ● ●
TOP3010A
Topside H2S Scavenger 
Pump
Pump P5 Upper
○ ● ○ ● ○ ● ●
●
TOP3010B
Topside H2S Scavenger 
Pump
Pump P5 Upper
○ ● ○ ● ●
TOP8511A Wash Water Feed Pump Pump P5 Upper ○ ● ○ ●
TOP8511B Wash Water Feed Pump Pump P5 Upper ○ ● ○ ● ○ ● ●
TOVZ2001A 1st Stage Separator Vessel P5 Process ● ●
TOVZ2001A 1st Stage Separator Vessel P5 Process ● ●
TOVZ2001B 1st Stage Separator Vessel P5 Process ○ ● ● ●
TOVZ2001B 1st Stage Separator Vessel P5 Process ○ ● ● ●
Note:
○ : Exposed to fire obtained by using CFD model (e.g. KFX)
● : Exposed to fire obtained by using analytical model (e.g. Phast)
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Table 20 Impact analysis result comparisons in module P6
ID Descriptions Type Module 5min 10min 30min 60min 120min
TOVZ7521A Methanol Storage Drum Vessel P6 Top ○ ●
TOES7002
Fuel Gas Compressor 1 
Suction Cooler
Vessel P6 Upper ● ●
TOES7003
Fuel Gas Compressor 2 
Suction Cooler
Vessel P6 Upper ● ●
TOES7004
Fuel Gas Compressor 2 
Discharge Cooler
Vessel P6 Upper ○ ● ●
TOHE7001A Fuel Gas Heater Vessel P6 Upper ●
TOHE7001B Fuel Gas Heater Vessel P6 Upper ●
TOVF7001A Fuel Gas Fine Filter Vessel P6 Upper ●
TOVF7001B Fuel Gas Fine Filter Vessel P6 Upper ●
TOKA7001 Fuel Gas Compressor 1 Vessel P6 Process ●
TOKA7002 Fuel Gas Compressor 2 Vessel P6 Process ●
TOP2001A Dead Oil recirculation Pump Pump P6 Process ●
TOP2001B Dead Oil recirculation Pump Pump P6 Process ●
TOP7521A
Subsea Methanol Injection 
Pump
Pump P6 Process ●
TOP7521B
Subsea Methanol Injection 
Pump
Pump P6 Process ●
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TOP7524A
Topsides Methanol Injection 
Pump
Pump P6 Process ●
TOP7533A
Topsides Methanol Injection 
Pump
Pump P6 Process ●
TOVF7525A
Subsea Methanol Injection 
Filter A
Vessel P6 Process ●
TOVF7525B
Subsea Methanol Injection 
Filter B
Vessel P6 Process ●
TOVZ7001 HP Fuel Gas Scrubber Vessel P6 Process ○ ●
TOVZ7002 LP Fuel Gas Scrubber Vessel P6 Process ●
TOVZ7003
Fuel Gas Compressor 1 
Suction Scrubber
Vessel P6 Process ● ●
TOVZ7004
Fuel Gas Compressor 2 
Suction Scrubber
Vessel P6 Process ● ●
Note:
○ : Exposed to fire obtained by using CFD model (e.g. KFX)
● : Exposed to fire obtained by using analytical model (e.g. Phast)
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Table 21 Impact analysis result comparisons in module S5
ID Descriptions Type Module 5min 10min 30min 60min 120min
TOVZ2703
Produced Water Skimmer 
Degassing Drum
Vessel S5 Upper
TOVZ2002 2nd Stage Separator Vessel S5 Upper ●
TOVZ2002 2nd Stage Separator Vessel S5 Upper ●
TOES7201 Dump Cooler Vessel S5 Upper
TOES2702A









































Produced Water Treatment 
Pumps
Pump S5 Process ●
TOP2703B
Produced Water Treatment 
Pumps
Pump S5 Process ●
TOEP2501B Stabilized Oil Cooler Vessel S5 Process ●
TOEP2501A Stabilized Oil Cooler Vessel S5 Process ●
TOP2001D Dead Oil Recirculation Pump Pump S5 Process ●
TOP2703A
Produced Water Treatment 
Pumps
Pump S5 Process ●
TOP2001C Dead Oil Recirculation Pump Pump S5 Process ●
Note:
○ : Exposed to fire obtained by using CFD model (e.g. KFX)
● : Exposed to fire obtained by using analytical model (e.g. Phast)
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4.6. Risk Control
4.6.1.Passive Fire Protection Rating Results
The rate of Passive Fire Protection (PFP) is determined by
the developed fire risk analysis module of IFECRA system. For 
example, the critical target TOES 7004 is exposed to jet fire during 
5 minutes using CFD model (e.g. KFX). However, the critical target
TOES 7004 is exposed to jet fire during 10 minutes using analytical 
model (e.g. Phast). Based on results of impact analysis, the rate of 
PFP can be obtained. Table 22 to Table 23 list the results for 
determining the rate of PFP.
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Fig. 58 PFP rating results by using IFECRA system
Table 22 Results of PFP rating by using CFD model (e.g. KFX)
ID Descriptions Type Module PFP rate
TOVF8510B
Wash Water Cartridge 
Filter
Vessel P5 Upper J120
TOVF8510A
Wash Water Cartridge 
Filter
Vessel P5 Upper J120
TOVZ3010
H2S Scavenger Buffer 
Drum
Vessel P5 Upper J10
TOVZ8510 CST Buffer Drum Vessel P5 Upper J30
TOVZ2001B 1st Stage Separator Vessel P5 Process J5
TOVZ2001B 1st Stage Separator Vessel P5 Process J5
TOVZ7521A Methanol Storage Drum Vessel P6 Top J5
TOES7004
Fuel Gas Compressor 2 
Discharge Cooler
Vessel P6 Upper J5
TOVZ7001 HP Fuel Gas Scrubber Vessel P6 Process J5
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Table 23 Results of PFP rating by using analytical model 
(e.g. Phast)
ID Descriptions Type Module PFP rate
TOVZ7601
Cooling Water Expansion 
Drum
Vessel P5 Top J10
TOVF8510B
Wash Water Cartridge 
Filter
Vessel P5 Upper J120
TOVF8510A
Wash Water Cartridge 
Filter
Vessel P5 Upper J120
TOVZ3010
H2S Scavenger Buffer 
Drum
Vessel P5 Upper J10
TOVZ8510 CST Buffer Drum Vessel P5 Upper J60
TOVZ2001A 1st Stage Separator Vessel P5 Process J10
TOVZ2001A 1st Stage Separator Vessel P5 Process J10
TOVZ2001B 1st Stage Separator Vessel P5 Process J30
TOVZ2001B 1st Stage Separator Vessel P5 Process J30
TOVZ7521A Methanol Storage Drum Vessel P6 Top J5
TOES7002
Fuel Gas Compressor 1 
Suction Cooler
Vessel P6 Upper J5
TOES7003
Fuel Gas Compressor 2 
Suction Cooler
Vessel P6 Upper J5
TOES7004
Fuel Gas Compressor 2 
Discharge Cooler
Vessel P6 Upper J5
TOHE7001A Fuel Gas Heater Vessel P6 Upper J5
TOHE7001B Fuel Gas Heater Vessel P6 Upper J5
TOVF7001A Fuel Gas Fine Filter Vessel P6 Upper J5
TOVF7001B Fuel Gas Fine Filter Vessel P6 Upper J5
TOVF7525A
Subsea Methanol Injection 
Filter A
Vessel P6 Process J5
TOVF7525B
Subsea Methanol Injection 
Filter B
Vessel P6 Process J5
TOVZ7001 HP Fuel Gas Scrubber Vessel P6 Process J5
TOVZ7002 LP Fuel Gas Scrubber Vessel P6 Process J5
TOVZ7003
Fuel Gas Compressor 1 
Suction Scrubber
Vessel P6 Process J10
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TOVZ7004
Fuel Gas Compressor 2 
Suction Scrubber
Vessel P6 Process J10
TOVZ2002 2nd Stage Separator Vessel S5 Upper J5
TOVZ2002 2nd Stage Separator Vessel S5 Upper J5
TOEP2501B Stabilized Oil Cooler Vessel S5 Process J5
TOEP2501A Stabilized Oil Cooler Vessel S5 Process J5
TOVZ7201
Hot Water Expansion 
Drum
Vessel S6 Upper J5
TOVF7526A Methanol Supply Filter Vessel S6 Process J5
TOVF7526B Methanol Supply Filter Vessel S6 Process J5




In pre-FEED stage, the process design is under development, 
therefore FRA input data are frequently changed and insufficient. In 
this time, the number of equipment is counted manually from the 
process design (e.g. PFD, P&ID). In addition, the process design 
does not provide a specific piping length. Hence, the process piping 
lengths are roughly estimated. For these reasons, the leak 
frequency calculation often obtains a large variance in the results. 
Furthermore, the lack of layout information and the process data, a 
3D CFD fire simulation is not implemented in FRA because a 3D 
geometric model is not available.
Therefore, the main goal of this study is to develop an IFECRA 
system, which could be utilized to respond with the data quickly 
from the process design and to improve FRA results in pre-FEED 
stage. First of all, this study develops the IFECRA system to 
interface with the process simulator. Also, the process piping 
lengths are estimated using a routing algorithm to increase the 
accuracy of leak frequency calculation. In addition, the developed 
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IFECRA system is readily able to use a CFD model utilizing the 
simplified 3D model generation module. Finally, the IFECRA system
can automate the calculation which is needed in FRA to increase 
efficiency. The developed IFECRA system displays the output from 
the graphical user interface (GUI).
From the case study, it is clearly demonstrated that the 
developed IFECRA system can improve the accuracy of risk 
analysis, because the IFECRA system is able to use the CFD model. 
First of all, a fire simulation result such as design effect zone is
compared between CFD model and analytical model. In addition, the 
impact analysis and the rate of PFP are compared between CFD 
model and analytical model.
5.2. Findings
Through the case study, the findings of the study can be 
summarized. In order to apply the developed IFECRA system, a 
case study demonstrating a jet fire accident in the FPSO process 
area is performed. Through the observation of the case study, it is 
summarized that the risk analysis results used in the CFD model are
more accurate than the analytical model. Consequently, it is 
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confirmed that the developed IFECRA system can increase the 
accuracy of FRA in pre-FEED stage.
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7.1. Appendix A: Example Rule Set of Process Piping 
Lengths
As detailed process piping arrangements are not available in 
pre-FEED stage, the estimation of piping length are made for each 
piping size within each isolatable segment. The following rule set 
which is presented in Fig. 59, is applied to roughly estimate the 
piping length between two equipment items, depending on the 
modules in which they are located.
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Fig. 59 Rule set of process piping lengths
For example, if equipment A and B are located in P5 then
process piping length is 40.5m. If equipment A is located in P5 and 
B is located in P7 then process piping length is 106.5m
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7.2. Appendix B: Constraint Conditions in Piping 
Algorithm
In this section demonstrates the constraint conditions in piping 
algorithm. The process piping algorithm such as rectilinear method 
is used for calculating the 6 piping nodes and piping lengths. In 
addition, the process piping algorithm such as A* method is used for 
generating 729 nodes between equipment. Total 8 constraint 
conditions are visually described from Table 24 to Table 31.
Table 24 Constraint condition 1
Constraint condition 1 :    ≥   ,    ≥   ,    ≥   
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Table 25 Constraint condition 2
Constraint condition 2 :    ≥   ,    ≥   ,    <   
Table 26 Constraint condition 3
Constraint condition 3 :    ≥   ,    <   ,    ≥   
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Table 27 Constraint condition 4
Constraint condition 4 :    ≥   ,    <   ,    <   
Table 28 Constraint condition 5
Constraint condition 5 :    <   ,    ≥   ,    ≥   
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Table 29 Constraint condition 6
Constraint condition 6 :    <   ,    ≥   ,    <   
Table 30 Constraint condition 7
Constraint condition 7 :    <   ,    <   ,    ≥   
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Table 31 Constraint condition 8
Constraint condition 8 :    <   ,    <   ,    <   
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7.3. Appendix C: A Simple Example of A* Algorithm
A* method is a kind of searching algorithm that finds the 
smallest path cost from start to end. The heuristic equation of A* is 
given in below.
 ( ) =  ( ) + ℎ( ) +        
  = The last node on the path
 ( )
= The minimum cost of all routes to the end node 
via node n
 ( ) = The cost of the path from the start node to n
ℎ( )
= The shortest path cost from node n to the end 
node
         = The bending cost
Fig. 60 presents visually for the cost of the path from the start 
node to n,  ( ), and the shortest path cost from node n to the end 
node, ℎ( ) . In this study,  ( ) selects as 10 and ℎ( ) is a 
rectilinear distance such as below equation.
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ℎ( ) = |     −   | + |     −   | + |     −   |
(a) (b)
Fig. 60 Visual descriptions of (a) the cost of the path from the start 
node to n and (b) the shortest path cost from node n to the end 
node
In addition, path directions have set four direction without 
diagonal ways because there is no diagonal direction in the actual 
process piping in process area. Fig. 61 shows an example of path 
direction in this study. An example of path searching is visually 
described in Table 32.
A B A n B
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Fig. 61 Path directions from node n































































































Pre-FEED 단계에서 개념적 화재 & 폭발
위험도 평가를 위한 기반 모델 개발
해양 플랜트는 가연성 오일과 가스를 정제하는 프로세스를 제한된
영역에서 가지고 있기 때문에 탄화수소 화재/폭발 사고가 발생할
가능성이 크다. 화재/폭발 사고는 전체 해양플랜트 위험도에 큰 비중을
차지하고 있기 때문에 최근 안전에 대한 선주의 요구사항이 점점
구체화하고 다양해지는 추세에 있으며, 설계에 소비되는 시간을
효율적으로 단축하기 위하여 빠르게 위험도를 판단할 수 있는 기술을
필요로 한다. 실제로 위험도 평가는 통상적으로 해양 프로젝트의 전체
설계 과정에 걸쳐 이루어지고 있으며, 각 설계 단계의 활용 가능한
정보와 데이터의 수준에 따라서 정성적인 평가로부터 정량적인 평가로, 
간략한 해석으로부터 상세한 해석으로 평가 수준과 정확도를 높여
가면서 위험도 해석 결과를 설계에 반영하고 있다. 그렇지만 기존의
실제 프로젝트에서 수행되었던 초기 공정 설계 정보와 데이터 수준은
해양플랜트 상부구조의 화재/폭발 사고 위험도를 평가하는 데 있어서
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유동적이지 못하다. 또한, 초기 공정 설계 정보와 초기 데이터 수준을
고려한 위험도 해석 결과는 보수적인 측면이 있다.
본 논문에서는 기존 방법들의 문제점을 극복하고자 Pre-FEED 
단계에서 수시로 변하는 초기 공정 설계 값에 대응하고 해양플랜트
상부구조의 화재 위험도 평가 방법을 개발하기 위하여 기존 방법을 조사
및 분석하였다. 기존 방법에 대한 조사 및 분석 결과를 바탕으로 위험도
평가에 필요한 모든 계산과 데이터 전달을 체계적으로 관리할 수 있는
통합 시스템 즉, Integrated Fire & Explosion Conceptual Risk 
Analysis system (IFECRA)을 확립하였다.
화재/폭발 위험도 평가에 필요한 공정 데이터와 레이아웃 데이터를
정의하였다. 공정 시뮬레이터에서 추출한 데이터를 전달하는 표준 data 
transfer sheet 을 확립하였고, IFECRA 시스템에서 표준 data transfer 
sheet 을 import 할 수 있는 모듈을 개발 완료 하였다. 초기 공정
데이터를 가공하여 IFECRA 시스템 내 누출 빈도수 계산을 자동으로
계산하는 모듈을 개발 완료 하였고, 화재/폭발 해석에 필요한 3D model 
자동 생성 모듈을 개발 완료하여 화재/폭발 시뮬레이터와 연동할 수
있도록 하였다. 3D model 자동 생성 모듈로부터 생성된 모델을
이용하여 3D CFD 시뮬레이션을 수행할 가능성을 제공한다. 기존 2D 
simplified 화재/폭발 시뮬레이션 결과보다 상대적으로 정확도 높은
결과를 설계에 반영함으로써 설계비용 감소와 설계지연을 단축할
가능성을 제공한다. 위험성 평가 모듈은 시스템 내부 누출빈도 수와
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점화확률 계산 결과와 화재 시뮬레이터로부터 계산된 결과값을 입력
받아 평가에 필요한 Accidental Design Load (DAL) 값을 계산하여, 
화재 위험도 평가를 가능하도록 하였다. 본 논문에서 개발한 IFECRA 
시스템을 활용하여 확률론적 화재 위험도 평가 방법에 필요한 데이터를
자동으로 계산하였고, CFD 모델과 해석적 모델 화재 시뮬레이션 결과를
이용하여 설계 effect zone 를 계산하였다. 계산된 설계 effect zone 을
이용하여 프로세스 장비의 파손여부와 파손된 장비의 PFP rate 결정을
서로 비교하였다.
화재 위험도 해석 결과 본 논문에서 제시하는 IFECRA 시스템을
활용하여 수행한 위험도 해석 결과가 기존 방법보다 상대적으로
정확함을 확인하였다.
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